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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, empirically, state fragility – con-
ceptualised as a multi-dimensional phenomenon along the categories of authority, capacity 
and legitimacy – comes in several distinct configurations, yet that the number of such 
configurations is rather limited. We suggest that this finding has useful, previously 
unexplored implications for policy design vis-à-vis fragile states. We do not intend to call 
into question the necessity of country-specific analysis. A better grasp of “typical” forms 
of fragility, however, should help development agencies to better prepare for the types of 
situations they are most likely to be confronted with. The final section of the paper 
explores some of the practical implications that can be derived from our classification. 
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1  Introduction1 
This paper proposes an approach to empirically identify country groupings that are each 
characterised by a distinct constellation of state fragility. We build upon a theoretical 
framework that distinguishes three dimensions of statehood: authority, legitimacy and 
state capacity. We argue that current approaches towards measuring fragility do not 
properly account for the diversity of fragile situations. By assigning countries to certain 
problem constellations, our approach can lead to a better understanding of challenges in 
these countries; this approach is beyond the reach of one-dimensional approaches 
represented by many indexes on fragility. Such a differentiation of fragile states resonates 
with recent debates that have taken place in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding and during the IDA16 replenishment process (International Devel-
opment Association).  
Recent research on state fragility has emphasised that fragility can also occur at a sub-
national level in states that are generally considered stable (e.g. Naudé / McGillivray / 
Rossouw 2009; Guo / Freeman 2011). Nonetheless, most donor countries and multilateral 
institutions in development policy have country-based operation models and allocation 
systems, and despite an increasing role of non-state actors, states continue to be both 
major players and important objects of activities in the international system. Hence, we 
consider it appropriate that the unit of analysis in our approach remains the state. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Firstly, we argue the case for a differentiated view of state 
fragility and for moving from a uni-dimensional to a multi-dimensional concept. We then 
provide a brief review of the current debate on fragile states in order to derive the main 
categories that constitute fragility. Thirdly, we present the approach adopted in this paper. 
Here, we describe how we conceptualise and measure our three dimensions of fragility. 
Fourthly, based on statistical data, we present empirical results that identify seven groups 
of states that are characterised by specific constellations of our dimensions. We then 
present possible policy implications for each group. In our conclusion, we discuss 
strengths and limitations of the classification exercise presented here and some ways 
forward. 
2  Why classifying fragile states makes sense 
The weakness, fragility or failure of states has evolved into one of the major narratives of 
politics and international relations in the post-Cold War era, possibly en par with “global-
isation” and with the emergence of “new powers” such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India 
                                                 
1  We are grateful for comments and advice provided at various stages by Aaron Clauset, Jörg Faust, Gary 
Goertz, Kristian Gleditsch, Joe Hewitt, Seth Kaplan, Andrew Mack, Imme Scholz, Stella Seibert, Daniel 
Stegmüller and Mario Stumm. Research towards the paper was in part funded by the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) under a research grant on Development and 
Transformation in Fragile States. The paper’s approach and findings are the sole responsibility of the 
authors and should in no way be taken to represent the view of BMZ or the German government. 
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and China). Like the latter, state fragility is assumed to have profound impact on how key 
issues of global concern, such as climate change, poverty and violent conflict, can be 
addressed.  
Most recently, major multilateral development actors have given the issue of state fragility 
– often coupled with violent conflict – high visibility. In 2009 the first-ever European 
Report on Development was devoted to “Overcoming Fragility in Africa” (ERD 2009); in 
2010 the OECD Development Assistance Committee adopted a policy guidance paper on 
Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility (OECD / DAC 2011); and 
most recently, the 2011 World Development Report concentrated on “Conflict, Security 
and Development” (World Bank 2011). 
These reports demonstrate a significant demand on the part of policy-makers for 
orientation in dealing with fragile states. A rising number of fragility indexes that have 
emerged over the past years – such as the Failed States Index, the Index of State 
Weakness, the State Fragility Index, the Political Instability Index and many others – have 
tried to provide some of this orientation.2 The World Bank, too, has contributed to this 
endeavour (see Box 1). 
The problem with these indexes, however, is that they tend to simplify the complicated 
reality behind the stability or decay of statehood to such an extent that they are of very 
limited use for the operational task of crafting policies that could help prevent or mitigate 
state fragility. As recent studies have argued, the main issue with these indexes is not so 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive overview of these indexes, see Fabra Mata / Ziaja (2009). 
Box 1: The World Bank’s definition of fragile states 
An influential definition of state fragility from a development perspective is associated with the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index, a tool that was originally designed to 
measure eligibility for World Bank financing based on a set of normative governance and policy 
requirements. Beginning with its “low-income countries under stress” (LICUS) initiative, the World Bank 
introduced the bottom two quintiles of low-income countries in the CPIA scale as a working definition of 
fragility – a practice that was soon adopted by many other donor agencies. Later, the World Bank 
replaced the relative threshold of the bottom two quintiles with an absolute one, designating a state as 
fragile if its CPIA score was below or equalled 3.2.  
Any CPIA-based definition of fragile states, however, suffers from the fact that the index was designed 
for a different purpose. Above all, it comprises several indicators that cannot fairly be said to describe 
fragility (or statehood), such as trade liberalisation. Furthermore, as the CPIA score represents the mere 
aggregation of these indicators, it does not allow for a differentiated view of challenges to statehood, nor 
for deriving possible interventions. Lastly, as the CPIA predominantly reflects the performance of policies 
and institutions, it says little about the quality of state-society relations, which are increasingly considered 
to be pivotal for functioning statehood.  
The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report adopts a broader perspective by including situations 
of extensive criminal or political violence. At the indicator level, the CPIA-based criterion is 
complemented by measures of physical violence and the presence of international peacekeeping forces. 
Sources:  IDA (2007, 2); Fabra Mata / Ziaja (2009, 50–52); World Bank (2011). 
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much the ever-difficult challenge of measurement but rather their common conceptual 
assumption that a multi-dimensional concept such as statehood can be aggregated and 
projected onto a uni-dimensional scale without a massive loss – and even distortion – of 
information (see Fabra Mata / Ziaja 2009; Gutiérrez Sanín 2011). As a result, countries as 
diverse as Haiti and North Korea may end up in close neighbourhood to each other 
towards the bottom end of the Failed States Index 2010, although it is obvious that the 
respective challenges they face are rather different in nature3: a collapsed state unable to 
provide any basic safety and security for its population, on the one hand; and a repressive 
regime able to threaten the world with nuclear armament – although increasingly unable to 
feed its population – on the other.  
In many cases, the authors of fragility indexes are well-aware of the limitations innate to 
their instruments: at least some of them recommend their index merely as an “early-
warning” tool that warrants further analysis into any given case, and they caution against 
too far-reaching interpretations based on their data. Yet, case studies per se, on the other 
hand, incur the risk of idiosyncratic judgements that forego the methodological advantage 
of comparisons – which is why indexes became fashionable in the first place.  
As a consequence, more recent contributions have highlighted the importance of disaggre-
gating state fragility into key dimensions that need to be considered in their own right as 
well as in their interaction.4 Carment / Prest / Samy (2010), for example, propose a three-
dimensional view of statehood – distinguishing between authority, legitimacy and 
capacity – and present their Country Indicators for Foreign Policy not only in an 
aggregated form but also for each of the dimensions separately. Structuring the resulting 
list of country scores in a meaningful way, however, remains a task to be undertaken by 
their reader.  
Similar to Carment et al., yet based on work by the Commission on Weak States and US 
National Security (2004), Call (2010) identifies gaps in capacity, security and legitimacy 
as well as their interaction as the crucial variables defining state fragility. According to 
him, “[t]hese gaps are overlapping, but conceptually and logically distinct enough that 
they often lead to divergent policy prescriptions.” Call argues strongly for not conflating 
these three gaps but rather using them to categorise failed states. Implicitly applying a 
binary scale to each of his three dimensions of fragility (by distinguishing countries 
according to whether they face a certain gap or not), Call proposes a picture of three 
intersecting areas to illustrate what basically comes down to a three-dimensional cross-
tabulation with 2³ = 8 combinations. According to Call, each of these combinations (with 
the exception of the case where no gap at all exists) represents a distinct type of fragility 
challenge that requires a particular policy response. 
                                                 
3 See: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_ 
rankings. 
4 These works can build on a broad literature at the intersection of political science and policy advice that 
looked into the components of state fragility during the 2000s, but usually failed to combine these 
conceptual insights with comparative data for a large number of countries. For more details, see Section 
1 below. 
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We consider Call’s approach a notable improvement over earlier attempts to bridge the 
gap between data-based quantitative research and policy implications. We have, however, 
several reservations with regard to his methodology, the main one being that it projects the 
reality of a large number of countries onto an ideal-typical matrix – thus ignoring the 
problems emerging when boundaries blur and real-life phenomena refuse to group easily 
according to binary logics. Our aim in this paper is to sketch out a methodology that is 
based on the same initial idea as Call’s approach but tries to avoid some of its pitfalls. The 
ultimate goal is to provide a data-driven typology of state fragility that lends itself towards 
modestly generalisable policy implications. By this, we do not mean to deny the import-
ance of case-specific analyses. Rather, we assume that farsighted policies require instru-
ments that order reality not only according to theoretical assumptions but also on the basis 
of empirical observations. A more precise grasp of existing, typical forms of fragility 
should help development agencies and other actors to better prepare for the types of 
situations they are most likely to be confronted with. 
3  The debate on state fragility 
Both in its academic and its policy-oriented strands, the literature on state fragility 
abounds of studies investigating the causes and consequences of fragility and internal 
conflict and discussing possible contributions towards making states more resilient. Parts 
of this literature are of a more general, conceptual nature (e.g. Fukuyama 2004; Hameiri 
2007; Jones et al. 2008; Kaplan 2008), others rely on in-depth case studies (for instance, 
Rotberg 2003; Paris 2004; Schlichte 2005; Call / Wyeth 2008), and yet others use cross-
country data to compute correlations and infer causality (for example, Fearon / Laitin 
2004; Bratton / Chang 2006; Englehart 2009).5 In part to assist these latter efforts, and in 
part in order to satisfy public interest in easily accessible overviews of the “state of state 
fragility” in the world, a plethora of indexes classifying countries according to their 
statehood (or to any proxy chosen to represent this concept) has emerged (Fabra Mata / 
Ziaja 2009). 
3.1  The multi-dimensional character of state fragility 
A broad consensus exists across the literature that fragile states take very different forms. 
Some fail to provide basic services, such as primary schooling, health care or water supply 
and sanitation, to a sufficient degree and face eroding authority as a consequence. Others 
are drowning in civil war or criminal violence. Yet others are unable to extend their reach 
over all parts of their territory, with populations in some areas not recognising the 
legitimacy of the central state authorities. In some cases, these different types of problems 
combine and exacerbate each other; in others they do not. 
                                                 
5 Most of these studies ignore previous works on state weakness, e.g. Gros (1996), Jackson / Rosberg 
(1982), Migdal (1988), Helman / Ratner (1992).  
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Many authors would also argue that fragility problems – although varying in their scope 
and nature – revolve around a limited number of “functions”, “gaps” or, as we prefer to 
call them, dimensions. Authors disaggregating fragility in two, three, four or more 
dimensions include Milliken / Krause (2002), the Commission on Weak States and US 
National Security (2004), Schneckener (2004), Ghani / Lockhart / Carnahan (2005), 
Patrick (2006), Cliffe / Manning (2008), Carment / Prest / Samy (2010), Call (2010) and 
certainly many others. 
Despite the seeming variety of approaches in this literature, their underlying concepts of 
state functions are not so dissimilar. As Call (2010, 305) has observed, much of the 
literature has focussed on two concepts: effectiveness and legitimacy.6 Others, such as 
Carment / Prest / Samy (2010) and Call himself (2010), have argued that the provision of 
security is a capacity that is different in nature from the delivery of services such as water 
supply and sanitation or primary schooling, since it is intimately related to the state’s 
ability to protect its authority vis-à-vis competing actors, and have thus proposed to 
distinguish three main dimensions. Cliffe / Manning (2008), in turn, add public finance 
functions as an additional, analytically distinct fourth dimension (rather than viewing them 
as a subset of effective state capacity).7 
Yet, these debates have not introduced completely new aspects alien to earlier 
considerations. Rather, we can observe reconfigurations of more or less the same set of 
interdependent functions, where several options exist of how to draw analytical boundaries 
between them. As laid out further below, however, we argue that theoretical 
considerations militate in favour of a three-dimensional conceptualisation of statehood. 
One such approach has recently been presented by Charles Call. Thus, the following 
subsection gives a brief overview of his approach before we present our own theoretical 
argument and conceptualisation. 
3.2  Charles Call’s approach of three interdependent “gaps” of statehood 
Charles Call (2010) proposes to consider “gaps” in the areas of capacity, security and 
legitimacy as key factors driving state fragility (thus far relying on the Commission on 
Weak States and US National Security), but to keep them as distinct as possible rather 
than conflating them, as often done in indexes and other parts of the literature. “Overlaps” 
of two or three gaps in any given country should lead to interesting insights into their 
respective interaction, and policy responses in those cases should tackle the challenge of 
“balancing the gaps” (Call 2010).  
As can be seen in Figure 1, reproduced from Call’s article, this approach is able to 
illustrate the difference between the exemplary cases mentioned above, Haiti and North 
                                                 
6 This includes a broadly shared view among OECD donor agencies during much of the 2000s, according 
to which fragile states were those that were either unable or unwilling to carry out key tasks. 
7 In addition, Cliffe and Manning consider the provision of rule of law to be a crucial aspect closely 
linked to the security function (rather than to state capacity). 
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Korea, rather well. Thus far, we agree fully with Call’s assertion – both with regard to the 
importance of distinction and with regard to his conclusion – that the reality of fragile 
states differs in quality, depending on which dimensions of statehood are defunct. 
The problem with Call’s approach is that when he applies his model to the empirical 
world, his categorisation of states is based on an implicit binary logic: a gap exists or does 
not exist. Which of the two possibilities applies depends to a large extent on the arbitrary 
choice of a threshold. The consequence is two-fold. Firstly, the classification of individual 
countries may be misleading because a different threshold – possibly even on more than 
one dimension – might yield a completely different result. Secondly, the distinction of 
eight possible combinations (two values per each of the three dimensions) is purely ideal-
typical. It says nothing about the distribution of real-world phenomena along the three 
dimensions. In particular, in combination with the issue of thresholds, this instrument is 
unable to shed light on the quality of statehood (or its deficiencies) in the broad “midfield” 
of fragility. Yet, it is precisely this midfield that policy-makers should take an increasing 
interest in if they want to help prevent the decay of statehood in countries that have lately 
been fortunate enough not to be listed among the most fragile countries of all. 
4  Three dimensions of statehood 
In line with the many authors discussed above, we propose to conceptualise statehood (or 
its negative occurrence, fragility) as a phenomenon that is constituted of three distinct, 
though interrelated, dimensions: state authority, state capacity and state legitimacy (ACL). 
While our terminology is the same as that of Carment / Prest / Samy (2010), our con-
ceptualisation of these dimensions is not identical to theirs but rather resembles that of 
1 Figure 1: Intersecting gaps of statehood according to Call 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Call (2010). 
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Call (2010) and the Commission on Weak States (2004). The exact focus of each of these 
dimensions, however, is not directly borrowed from any of these works but derived from 
general conceptual considerations.  
We argue that, despite the obvious interdependence of state functions, a theoretical 
argument can be made to distinguish exactly these three dimensions of statehood. In fact, 
each of the three categories of authority, capacity and legitimacy has been the focus of a 
certain strand of political theory and represents a particular type of state-society relation.  
As Figure 2 illustrates, authority refers to the control of violence by the state, which, for 
this purpose, takes the freedom to use violence away from the people. This is a corporatist 
strand of political theory that views the state as a violence entrepreneur. It can be traced 
back to Thomas Hobbes and was developed, among others, by Charles Tilly (1985). More 
recently, North / Wallis / Weingast (2009) have contributed to this type of thinking. The 
exact degree of authority required to maintain a stable state is dependent on context factors 
such as popular expectations and the strengths of rivals. In any case, it is an empirical 
problem. 
State capacity, in turn, represents a state-society relation that is characterised by the state 
giving the provision of basic services to the people. These services include not only basic 
education and health care, but in an increasingly globalised world they encompass also a 
basic institutional setting for economic activities (legal framework, tax system, governing 
common goods etc.), macroeconomic policies and other basic state functions (cp. OECD 
2008). Failure to perform in one or more of these areas diminishes the life chances (i.e. the 
opportunities to improve one’s quality of life) for large parts of the population. The 
perspective of the state as a provider of services is that of a contractual relationship 
between state and society, as it was already developed by 17th century philosopher John 
Locke. Which services have to be delivered in order for the state to be considered as 
fulfilling its obligations cannot be generally answered. Again, social expectations are the 
most important yardstick here. 
 
Figure 2:  Three dimensions of statehood as distinct types of state-society relations 
 
 
   state society 
 
Authority:   control of violence (corporatist state) 
 
Capacity:   provision of services (contractualist state) 
 
Legitimacy:   acceptance of rule (contructivist state) 
 
 
    active 
 
    passive 
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Finally, legitimacy is about a type of state-society relation in which society itself is active, 
in that it accepts, or refuses to accept, the state’s claim to be the only legitimate actor to set 
and enforce generally binding rules (cp. Weber 1976). As legitimacy is closely linked to 
the forging of a sense of identity within a society, this concept can be viewed as stemming 
from a constructivist perspective on the state (e.g. Anderson 1991). 
While it is obvious that success or failure on each dimension can have direct or indirect 
effects on the other dimensions, we argue that empirical cases show that none of these 
effects is automatic or linear. 
4.1  Attributes and indicators of authority, capacity and legitimacy 
The three dimensions of statehood are still rather abstract concepts that cannot be directly 
observed. It is thus necessary to develop general attributes for each dimension. Based on 
these attributes, we propose to select a rather limited number of publicly available 
indicators that we use as proxies to measure a country’s degree of statehood (or 
“fragility”) in a given year along each of the dimensions.  
Our goal is to select only indicators that cannot be assumed to compensate for each other.8 
Instead, we assume that each indicator represents a necessary condition for a high score in 
the respective dimension – or, in other words, that a low score in one measure drives the 
overall performance in that dimension.9  
We will only briefly name and define the variables here and argue why we include them, 
based on the theory introduced above. For more detailed explanations on sample, sources 
and modification of the datasets, please see Annex 4. 
Authority 
The authority dimension refers to the extent to which the state holds the monopoly of 
violence and can secure its claim on this monopoly vis-à-vis competitors. A diminished 
authority reduces the state’s ability to define and execute rules and protect citizens from 
wilful violence. By implication, authority is thus related to the degree that the state can 
guarantee the physical integrity of its citizens and protect them from physical threats. 
However, a certain degree of violent crime seems to be unavoidable in any society without 
necessarily calling the state’s monopoly of violence into question. The true question here 
really is whether, and to which degree, the state faces an organised challenge to its 
monopoly of violence from one or more parties within or outside its society. 
                                                 
8  Assumed compensation is one of the weakest points of most commonly used indexes of state fragility. 
In almost any case, it is theoretically unjustifiable to assume that a higher degree of performance in one 
measure makes up for a lower degree of performance in another measure. Nonetheless, most models are 
based on average scores – a procedure that rests on exactly the assumption of compensation; see Fabra 
Mata / Ziaja (2009). Our approach intends to avoid this pitfall. 
9  The implications this approach has for data transformation is discussed in Annex 4. For a methodo-
logical argument, see Goertz / Mahoney (2011, 31). 
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An indicator that reflects our conceptualisation of authority quite well is the “monopoly of 
violence” indicator from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). It is based on 
expert judgement and is supposed to measure the extent to which the state monopolises 
the use of force over the entire territory (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008, 73). However, BTI 
data is available only for about 125 countries and only every other year since 2006. 
Two direct outcome measures of the state’s success to maintain its monopoly of violence 
are related to deaths that occur unauthorised by the state. The first of these indicators is 
battle-related deaths, taken from the joint battle-related deaths database of the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP). These include all casualties directly related to combat – 
civilians and military – on the territory of a specific country (UCDP 2011b). We take this 
measure to reflect the intensity of internal and external attacks on the integrity of a state 
and thus the degree to which the state faces an organised challenge to its monopoly of 
violence. 
A second measure is intentional homicides, i.e. “unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a 
person by another person” (UNODC 2011, 1). The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime collects information from international and national institutions on a yearly basis, 
stemming from the health or criminal justice sector. As stated above, we argue that only 
above a certain quantity of “usual” crime is it appropriate to assume that homicides reflect 
an organised challenge to the state’s monopoly of violence. 
Capacity 
Capacity means the state’s ability to provide its citizens with basic life chances. These 
include the protection from (relatively easily) avoidable harmful diseases; a basic 
education that allows for an active participation in social and economic activities; and a 
basic administration that regulates social and economic activities sufficiently to increase 
collective gains and avoid massive negative externalities. 
Useful indicators of the protection from diseases are improved access to clean water, 
which is known to have massive positive impact, as well as a low rate of child mortality. 
For the latter, we use under-five mortality per 1,000 births, as published by the Institute 
for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME 2010); for the former, we refer to data from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
In terms of basic education, we consider primary enrolment an appropriate measure, i.e. 
the “ratio of children of official school age based on the International Standard Classi-
fication of Education 1997 who are enrolled in school to the population of the correspond-
ing official school age” (UNESCO 2011). 
As for basic administration, BTI again offers an indicator that refers to the existence of 
fundamental structures of a civilian administration, such as a basic system of courts and 
tax authorities. While it does not assess their quality, a minimum degree of profession-
alism and meritocracy has to exist for a civilian state apparatus to be maintained (Ber-
telsmann Stiftung 2008, 74).    
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Legitimacy 
The third dimension, legitimacy, is notoriously complicated to measure. In line with our 
conceptualisation of legitimacy as acceptance of rule, our indicators need to capture 
empirical (rather than normative) legitimacy. In theory, it should suffice to use mass 
surveys that ask the question of whether an individual accepts the rule exerted by the state 
authorities of their country as legitimate. In practice, however, the results of such surveys 
– if feasible in the first place – are that much less reliable the more illegitimate a state is. 
Any result would therefore suffer from a systematic measurement error (or bias) produced 
by exactly the property to be measured in the first place, or at least from a strong 
theoretical assumption that such a bias should exist. In addition, existing survey data from 
several regional “barometers” developed in recent years have yet to reach a sufficient 
degree of methodological convergence that would allow for the merging of their 
respective data in one dataset. 
Void of the almost direct observations that reliable survey data would yield, we propose to 
use indirect measures that are based on the theoretical assumption that legitimate rule 
requires a lower degree of state repression to achieve obedience and induces a lower 
number of citizens to leave their country for political reasons. With regard to the first 
aspect, the argument is that, due to its high cost, repression is only the second-best option 
for a state to resort to. Consequently, a state will keep it at its lowest possible level, while, 
the less legitimate the state is, the more it will depend on such measures (following 
Wintrobe 1998). Or, in short: “[T]he lower the degree of legitimacy the higher should be 
the amount of coercion” in a state (Dogan 1992, 120). For our purpose, the Political Terror 
Scale (PTS), which measures the degree to which a state resorts to violence (“physical 
integrity violations”) in order to preserve its power (Gibney / Cornett / Wood 2011), is an 
adequate indicator. 
The argument that a state that can allow for an unrestricted media will be sure of its 
legitimacy is based on the same reasoning. Consequently, freedom of the press is also an 
appropriate indicator of legitimacy. The data we use is extracted from the Reporters 
Without Borders database (RSF 2009). 
Lastly, a legitimate state can be expected to force fewer citizens into political exile (or 
emigration). From the people’s point of view, even if they have no possibility of expres-
sing their opinion publicly, e.g. due to a lack of civic and political rights or press freedom, 
they (usually) still have the option of “voting with their feet”, that is, of emigrating and 
seeking asylum for political reasons. In order to better distinguish political motivations for 
emigration from other reasons, we consider the number of granted asylums by country of 
origin (UNHCR 2011) an appropriate measure of this factor. 
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4.2  Aggregation 
We aggregate the indicators for each dimension by taking the minimum value that any of 
the indicators takes in a given country year. This procedure is based on the assumption 
that each attribute of the same dimension represents a necessary condition for good 
performance. In other words, the “weakest link”, i.e. the smallest value within each 
dimension, represents the best proxy for a country’s score on that dimension in a given 
year (Goertz / Mahoney 2011, 31). For example, a country with a good official record in 
observing physical integrity rights and few asylum seekers could just be successful in non-
violent repression and preventing emigration. We would thus consider limitations of press 
freedom most indicative of a country’s legitimacy, and not the average of all three 
measures. As a result, our dimension scores are more valid than aggregate measures (such 
as factor scores). They are also immune to upward measurement error, unless it occurs in 
all indicators of one dimension at once. Summary statistics, histograms and bivariate 
scatter plots of the resulting aggregate scores on authority, legitimacy and capacity are 
reproduced in Annex 5. 
4.3  Identification of clusters 
After having constructed the dimension variables, we enter these into a mixture model to 
identify country groups, or clusters (cp. Fraley / Raftery 2006; Ahlquist / Breunig 2012). 
Identifying clusters requires assigning countries to specific groups. There is no assump-
tion, however, that countries remain in their respective groups permanently. What we do 
Table 1: Conceptualisation and measurement of state fragility 
Concept  State fragility (or, inverse, statehood) 
Dimensions Authority Capacity Legitimacy 
Attributes Monopoly of violence:  
• no (effectively) 
competing claims;  
• no large-scale 
(organised) violation of 
physical integrity of 
persons 
Provision of basic life 
chances:  
• protection from easily 
avoidable diseases; 
• basic education;  
• provision of basic 
administration 
Acceptance of rule:  
• no resort to state 
repression as a means 
to achieve obedience;  
• no politically motiv-
ated emigration 
Indicators • Monopoly of violence 
(BTI) 
• Homicides (UNODC) 
• Battle deaths (WDI) 
• Under-5 mortality 
(IHME) 
• Primary enrolment 
(WDI) 
• Access to water (WDI)  
• Basic administration 
(BTI) 
• Physical integrity 
rights violations (PTS) 
• Press freedom 
violations (RSF) 
• Granted asylums by 
country of origin 
(UNHCR) 
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expect is that the groups are relatively stable configurations over the medium term, 
whereas the individual countries can move between the groups. In other words, our 
methodology is geared towards identifying types of groups, while we do not claim that the 
same methodology is ideal to assess exactly which group a certain country belongs to. 
The methodology is based on the assumption that the distribution of dimension scores is 
normal (i.e. Gaussian) within each group. To find the groups without having an existing 
indicator pointing at which country belongs to which group, the algorithm tries to fit two 
or more (multivariate) normal distributions within the “observed” distributions of the input 
variables. In other words, we try to identify groups within our sample by looking at the 
sample’s shape. When more than one variable is considered – in this case our three 
dimension scores – the problem becomes quite complex. To determine the best solution, 
the clustering algorithm tests various specifications with different numbers of groups, 
providing a Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for each specification. The model with 
the highest BIC has (formally) the best fit. Size, shape and orientation of the multivariate 
normal distributions can be specified a priori or selected according to the BIC. 
5  Results 
We ran several specifications for datasets with single years, moving averages and pooled 
years between 2003 and 2010. The number of groups and the type of specifications 
indicated by the BIC varies across years, which is not surprising since the scores vary as 
well. When defined solely by the BIC, the group number varies between three and seven. 
In most cases, four is formally the best solution. As we are interested in a more detailed 
picture and willing to accept a slightly lower degree of formal fit (cp. Grimmer / King 
2010), we chose the point on the BIC curve that is on average the last one before the curve 
decreases significantly, which was seven. After fixing the number of groups to seven and 
the multivariate normal distributions to be equal in size and shape, most years and moving 
averages provide roughly similar groupings. 
Figure 3 provides scatter plots of all countries respective to all possible pairs of di-
mensions for the average scores for 2007 to 2009. Group membership is indicated by 
differently coloured and shaped markers. The plots already indicate that we are confronted 
with a multi-dimensional phenomenon: the groups are not sequentially ordered so that 
they could be projected onto a one-dimensional vector, but the pattern is more complex. 
The groups represented by green asterisks and blue x’s, for example, overlap when 
considering legitimacy and capacity only. They are, however, clearly separate on the 
authority dimension, where the former group performs substantially better. 
As in all statistical analysis, there is uncertainty in our results, i.e. countries do not fit 
equally well into the assigned classes. In the following description of the country groups, 
we include only those 145 countries that can be grouped with an uncertainty below 0.25. 
This means that within our model the probability of a country belonging to a certain group 
is at least three times higher than the joint probability of it belonging to any other group. 
Out of our sample of 163 countries, 116 are classified with an uncertainty below 0.1. 
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To assess the degree to which a country is representative of its group, we develop an 
indicator of typicality. Typicality is measured as the sum of the squared differences of a 
country’s dimension scores from the respective medians of its group, standardised to a 0 to 
1 scale. The higher the score, the more representative a country is of its group. 
We use box plots to summarise the group properties (see Annex 1). The box plots have a 
black bar indicating the median, a coloured bar containing the two middle quartiles of all 
cases, and the whiskers and dots mark the extremes. Each plot depicts a group’s properties 
with regard to authority (A), legitimacy (L) and capacity (C). The groups have been 
labelled “A” to “G”. These labels do not imply any order, the classification is nominal, not 
ordinal, i.e. no group is necessarily better than any other. The final plot (“X”) does not 
represent a group but rather the distribution of those countries that we did not group due to 
their uncertainty above 0.25 (as referred to above). 
Figure 3: Scatter plots of the latent dimensions (2007–2009) 
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Group A combines those countries with the largest deficiencies in all dimensions. It is 
most different from other groups with regard to authority, where only a few countries from 
Group D perform worse. On average, Group A also scores lowest on capacity and 
legitimacy, but performance varies more and overlaps with Group B on capacity and 
Groups C, D and E on legitimacy. Typical countries for Group A include Chad, DR 
Congo and Sudan.  
Group B has low capacity, but its authority and legitimacy scores are far better than those 
of Group A. Group B includes many of the poor but relatively stable developing countries 
that are known to provide a favourable environment for donor activities. Typical examples 
are Madagascar, Ghana or Burkina Faso.  
Group C is the largest group with 37 members. It has similar capacity scores as Group B 
but relatively lower levels of authority and a broad range of legitimacy scores in the lower 
area of the scale. Due to its large size, this group displays a large variance in all 
dimensions. The most typical countries are Congo, Uganda and Kenya.  
Group D has similarly spread levels of legitimacy as Group C, but despite clearly higher 
levels of capacity, its authority scores are the lowest for any countries outside Group A. 
Typical countries for Group D include Algeria, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.  
Group E has good authority and relatively good capacity scores, but it drops off with 
regard to legitimacy, which is again spread over a broad, yet relatively lower, spectre of 
the scale. Tunisia, Belarus and Egypt are typical countries in this group.  
Group G has clearly the best scores on all dimensions, and Group F is following suit. 
These two groups host the best performers across all indicators. 
As can be expected, non-assigned countries – represented in the box plot entitled “X” – 
cover a broad range of scores across all three dimensions. However, there are no countries 
with an authority score below 0.38 left unassigned.  
The results show nicely that it is not recommendable to measure a multi-dimensional 
concept such as fragility with a one-dimensional index score: Group D is worse than 
Group B in authority, but better in capacity. They are “non-comparable” when considering 
authority and capacity simultaneously because nobody can tell how much authority could 
compensate for how much capacity (cp. Gutiérrez Sanín 2011). With the clustering 
approach, we can distinguish these non-comparable groups. Classifications derived from 
additive indexes such as The Failed States Index or the CPIA (or IDA Resource 
Allocation) cannot distinguish these groups: there, they receive very similar scores (see 
the Figures in Annex 3).   
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6  Different policies for different types of “fragile statehood” 
Our results suggest that out of the seven groups identified on the basis of our data, five are 
of potential concern for development donors (Groups A, B, C, D and E). Four of them (A, 
B, C and D) cover most IDA-only recipients. Groups F and G, by contrast, are of no or 
little concern from a fragility point of view, nor do they include typical aid recipients. 
This is not to say that we propose to stretch the meaning of the attribute “fragile” to all 
five groups “of concern”. Rather, we suggest that an analysis undertaken from a multi-
dimensional fragility perspective merely leads us to conclude that countries belonging to 
these groups face particular challenges related to their statehood, yet that the respective 
extent and configuration of these challenges differ greatly between the groups. 
The empty spaces between existing configurations, as shown in Figure 3, remind us that 
our variables are strongly correlated. Higher degrees of capacity or legitimacy are mostly 
found in countries with commensurate levels of authority. Likewise, low levels of state 
legitimacy seldom go in hand with high levels of capacity. These findings do not, 
however, provide additional insights into potential causalities underlying these 
correlations. It is a widely held assumption that providing basic peace and security must 
be a first priority in places that face multiple challenges at the same time; others argue that 
only a capable or legitimate state is ever able to achieve peace. 
Table 2 gives a summary overview of which policy goals require priority attention in 
which group of statehood and what the implications could be for external donor support in 
each case. The word “priority” is meant rather literally here. Failure to mention a policy 
area is not meant to imply its unimportance. Rather, a priority goal should be understood 
as the main criterion from which the usefulness of activities in other areas should be 
assessed.  
For countries of the Group A type, a broad consensus has emerged over the last years that 
the main priority under such circumstances must be to improve security – which in many 
cases means to end organised violence by reaching some form of peace. However, there is 
less agreement about the next steps. Some argue that immediate socioeconomic gains are 
necessary to secure a more sustained peace (the “peace dividend”), while others argue that 
establishing a minimum of legitimate state institutions might be no less – or even more – 
important. Some recent evaluations of external engagement, such as in South Sudan and 
Sri Lanka, suggest that the political process following a peace agreement should be a high 
priority to be taken care of, since peace settlements are rarely a done deal but need close 
attendance so that all parties honour their commitments and resist the temptation to renege 
from earlier agreements as soon as the first difficulties emerge and new conflicting issues 
arise (see Chapman et al. 2009; Bennett et al. 2010). 
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Countries in Group B, by contrast, feature relatively well-functioning state structures (and 
state-society relations) that are able to maintain a decent state monopoly of violence and 
garner basic legitimacy among larger parts of the population. In such countries – which 
some would argue are the typical clients of the “Paris Agenda” – the most reasonable 
priority to pursue is improving the state’s capacity to provide basic services, a conducive 
environment for economic activities and better governance (including the rule of law). 
Group C, constituting the largest group identified, is generally characterised by lower 
levels of authority and legitimacy than Group B, yet a broader spread of capacity (from 
lowest levels to almost average). Obviously, strengthening state capacity is a need in these 
countries, yet investments in a higher legitimacy of the state can contribute substantially 
towards making capacity gains more sustainable and also improving authority. 
In countries of Group D, with the second lowest authority levels among all groups, 
mitigating and preventing violence clearly has to be the top priority. While in many cases 
“criminal” violence seems to dominate the picture, research has shown that the boundary 
Table 2: Implications for policies on state fragility 
Group  
(typical 
countries) 
Character Priority goal Character of external support 
Group A  
(Chad, DR 
Congo, Sudan 
etc.) 
Extremely low levels 
in all three dimensions: 
authority, capacity and 
legitimacy 
Focus on the provision of 
basic security first. Then 
bring quick socioeconomic 
gains and/or establish the 
basics of legitimate politics 
(debated!) 
Broad-based  international 
engagement; peacebuilding 
and statebuilding  
Group B 
(Madagascar, 
Ghana, Burkina 
Faso etc.) 
Very low levels of 
capacity, but decent 
authority and above-
average legitimacy 
Strengthen capacity in 
state, society and economy 
Alignment with country 
system and local priorities 
(“Paris Agenda”) 
Group C 
(Rep. Congo, 
Uganda, Kenya 
etc.) 
Mostly very low levels 
of capacity but also 
relatively low on 
authority; diverse, 
though mostly at the 
lower end, on 
legitimacy 
Improve capacity, but 
combine it with 
strengthening legitimacy 
Offer support for capacity, 
yet encourage (or demand) 
better governance based on 
broader legitimacy 
Group D 
(Algeria, 
Venezuela, the 
Dominican 
Republic etc.) 
Decent capacity, yet 
high levels of violence 
Prevent violence; invest in 
constructive state-society 
relations 
Statebuilding and 
governance support based on 
meaningful political 
dialogue; coordination 
essential 
Group E 
(Tunisia, Belarus, 
Egypt etc.) 
Good authority and 
decent capacity, but 
mostly lower levels of 
legitimacy 
More legitimate rule Cautious support of more 
legitimate governance unless 
and until opportunity for a 
broad engagement opens up 
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between political violence and widespread criminal violence is often blurred, and the 
disaffection of large numbers of (predominantly male) youths with the state contributes to 
a general atmosphere of lawlessness and “ungoverned” areas. Under such circumstances, 
the state needs to massively invest in more constructive state-society relations that give 
those who feel structurally marginalised an increasing sense of holding a stake in the 
future development of the state. While in Group A the relative importance of immediate 
socioeconomic benefits is a matter of ongoing debate, in countries of Group D, which are 
substantially better off economically and often considered as emerging economies, an 
element of social equity and the terms of how existing social wealth (e.g. through natural 
resources) is being shared across society are crucial for a sustainable solution of the 
existing authority problems and also the serious legitimacy issues that many countries in 
this group face. Consequently, external engagement should focus on governance and 
broader aspects of statebuilding, including the terms of the political settlement. A high 
degree of coordination is essential to ensure sufficient leverage, while existing and 
functioning state structures and self-defined national priorities will have to be taken into 
consideration. A meaningful political dialogue will often have to provide the basis for any 
effective engagement in the first place. 
Group E, despite its broad spectre of legitimacy scores, includes many countries with 
serious legitimacy issues, among them many of the “Arab Spring” countries of 2011, but 
also some of the most authoritarian post-Socialist states of Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia.10 The revolutions in North Africa have clearly signified the limits of authoritarian 
stability in these countries. Addressing the legitimacy gap needs to be the priority in such 
an environment, and external support must be first and foremost oriented towards this 
objective. While revolutions cannot – and should not! – be planned from outside, agents of 
change within and outside the state apparatus need support and encouragement, and 
illegitimate practices require a clear response. Under conditions of closed regimes, support 
on the ground will often have to be cautious and carefully chosen so as to not endanger 
partners or donor staff. However, these activities should be designed in such a way that 
they can be built upon and scaled up, should a political liberalisation allow for a far 
broader engagement. 
7  Conclusion: strengths and limitations of classifying fragile states 
Our results suggest that state fragility should indeed be considered as a multi-dimensional 
concept, as one loses policy-relevant information when collapsing our three dimensions 
into one. The assumption of many policy-makers that fragile countries differ and that they 
need separate approaches is justified. Total idiosyncrasy, however, is not justified. Rather, 
it seems warranted to develop further our tools of identification of clusters of fragility (or 
statehood more generally) and link them with an evaluation of the impact of different 
policy responses for each of these groups. This could serve as a better starting point for 
                                                 
10  It is important to remember that the data used here precedes the 2011 political upheaval in the Arab 
world. 
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country-specific programming than general notions of “fragility” have provided in the 
past. 
With regard to the methodology presented here, there are still some technical 
improvements to be made. The ability of the mixture model algorithm to cluster results is 
limited due to our small sample size. Nonetheless, we consistently find similar 
constellations of our dimension variables in groups from different years and specifications. 
This supports our hypothesis that there actually are empirical patterns of fragility that 
could help to inform policy advice. The first potential application of our typology is thus 
the sorting of policy approaches, which are, on average, more promising in some groups 
than in others (not to substitute detailed in-case analysis, but to quickly grasp the 
manoeuvring space and reduce complexity for macro-analyses). 
The current results do not allow for a comparison over time yet. This is a rather complex 
issue when using explorative models, since too many “open ends” prohibit meaningful 
interpretation. To make our approach useful for comparison over time, one will have to fix 
certain parts of the model a priori to make results more stable and interpretable. There are 
several options how to go about restricting the model. One option is to include stronger 
assumptions about the properties of certain groups into the model. A Bayesian approach 
would allow including prior information such as the expectation to find OECD countries 
clustered at the positive end, and post-war countries at the lower end, relying less on the 
few data points we have for the latter group, for example, and leading to more stable and 
comparable results. Another option is to take one period as a reference point and then 
recalculate the classes for all years relative to these reference points. Based on either of 
these methods, one could investigate whether certain groups grow or shrink over time, 
indicating whether and how general development challenges change. 
One further drawback of our current operationalisation is the lack of real-time monitoring: 
most variables are available only on a yearly basis, they become available with a lag of at 
least one year, and many are slowly-changing structural variables. But if combined with 
more sensitive early warning systems or disaster response mechanisms, the country 
groupings could provide an additional source of information on how to best deal with the 
issue of concern, proposing reaction patterns in cases of emergency for different kinds of 
states. 
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Annex 3: Other country indicators and indexes by group of fragility 
 
 
 
Figure: Failed States Index by groups 
 
   
Figure: GDP per capita by groups 
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Figure: IDA Resource Allocation Index by groups 
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Annex 4:  Data sources and data treatment 
Before we describe in more detail the data used in our approach and the operations 
undertaken to turn the data into useful indicators of the dimensions of statehood, it is 
important to remember here that our goal is not to give a valid measure of statehood for 
each individual country but rather to identify the types of clusters that states group in 
when measured along our three-dimensional scale. Singular outliers that may appear 
because of exceptional contextual circumstances or doubtful country scores as a result of 
exceptionally bad data should not be expected to have a significant influence on the 
validity of the general clustering. 
Most of the variables included in the models have a number of missing observations, 
either for some countries or even for whole years. In order to remedy this problem, 
multiple imputation is applied to the dataset. Rather than listwise deletion or manual linear 
imputation, this approach uses the observed data to extract information about the missing 
observations in order to fill them in and construct multiple “completed” datasets. The 
uncertainty of the estimation is then reflected by the variation of the imputed values, so 
that the “best guess” of their real size is the mean of the imputed cells (Honaker / King 
2010, 565). 
In addition to the core variables of the model, a number of additional indicators are 
included in order to increase the information level available to the imputation software 
(Amelia II for R by Honaker / King / Blackwell 2010). In order to make the data more 
evenly distributed and keep it within borders if applicable, some variables are further 
transformed during imputation: 
The following lines present details on the core indicators of the model and the operations 
applied to transform the data where necessary. Where variables are heavily skewed or 
have outliers, a natural logarithm is applied (granted asylums, battle deaths, homicides, 
press freedom). Since proportional data is sharply bounded between 0 and 1, a logistic 
transformation makes the distribution symmetric while avoiding imposing the strong 
assumptions of bounds (primary enrolment, improved access to clean water) (Honaker / 
King / Blackwell 2010). 
After imputation, a standard approach is applied to most variables to prepare them for 
classification and clustering: first, outliers of “granted asylums” variable are eliminated by 
cutting at plus and minus two standard deviations. This is based on the – anecdotally 
plausible – assumption that, at this level, the maximum effect of the represented attribute 
is already reached. The marginal effect of an even more extreme value is assumed to be 
zero. In addition, variables that are assumed to have a constantly decreasing marginal 
effect with increasing value are then logged. We treat homicides, battle deaths, under-five 
mortality and granted asylums as such variables. Finally, some variables need to be 
inverted so that across our transformed dataset, lower values represent “worse” indicators 
than higher ones (press freedom violations, under-five mortality and granted asylums) and 
all indicators are standardised from 0 to 1. 
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Apart from the “standard recipe”, some measures need special treatment or require 
definitions in addition to the ones already given. These are briefly described below. 
Monopoly of violence 
The BTI covers only developing, emerging, and transition countries, thus it is assumed 
that OECD states not included in the dataset would receive the highest score, i.e. 10. 
These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and the United 
Kingdom. 
Homicides 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime collects information from international 
and national institutions, stemming from the health or criminal justice sector. Data used is 
chosen following the International Homicide Statistics’ (HIS) methodology: priority is 
given to cross-national data. The focus is on criminal justice data, if possible from United 
Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems  
(UN-CTS) due to the consistency of both the definition of “homicide” and the questions of 
the survey. This information exists for the majority of countries in most years. If this is not 
the case, Interpol numbers are used, followed by national sources. In the case of non-
availability of criminal justice data, health system information is considered, preferably 
provided by the World Health Organisation (WHO), then by national institutions. (For a 
detailed description of the HIS methodology, data sources and their usage, see UNODC 
2011.)  
Unlike all other indicators, the homicides data is transformed in such a way that the lowest 
(i.e. “worst”) value is now 0.25 and the highest (i.e. “best”) equals 1. This assumes that 
even though a state might suffer a relatively high number of homicides, it can still be 
considered to hold the monopoly of violence over its territory as long as it does not see 
any battle-related deaths.  
Battle-related deaths 
The battle deaths data is taken from the battle related deaths database of the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2011b). Battle deaths are defined as “deaths caused by the 
warring parties that can be directly related to combat over the contested incompatibility 
[...] All fatalities – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations are counted as 
battle-related deaths” (UCDP 2011a, 5–6). 
In order to create a relative, more meaningful number, the absolute head count is 
calculated per 100,000 inhabitants. We use the population information provided by the 
Penn World Tables (Heston / Summers / Aten 2009). 
Furthermore, since the database claims completeness, it is assumed that there are no “true 
missings” but rather, that countries not included for a specific year have the real count of 0. 
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Battle deaths are truncated at the level of 10 and then inverted to make 10 battle deaths per 
100,000 people a 0 value in the model indicator, arguing that – calculated for a country 
with 10 million inhabitants – this makes 1,000 deaths a year and is thus what others 
consider a full-scale war (Gleditsch et al. 2002). A battle deaths count of 0 then becomes 
an indicator value of 1 while every single fatality is considered a loss of authority 
significant enough to make the lowest non-zero count a 0.5 in the indicator. 
Net Enrolment Rate in Primary Education 
The net enrolment rate is the “ratio of children of official school age based on the 
International Standard Classification of Education 1997 who are enrolled in school to the 
population of the corresponding official school age.” Primary education, furthermore, 
provides children with “a sound basic education in reading, writing and mathematics along 
with an elementary understanding of other subjects such as history, geography, natural 
science, social science, art and music” (UNESCO 2011, primary education). 
Political Terror Scale 
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) is based on the yearly country reports of Amnesty 
International and the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
and is available for the years 1976 to 2009. It ranges from one (“Countries under a secure 
rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. 
Political murders are extremely rare”) to five (“Terror has expanded to the whole 
population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness 
with which they pursue personal or ideological goals”) (Gibney / Cornett / Wood 2011). 
Freedom of the press 
Reporters Without Borders aim at assessing the state of affairs of the “degree of freedom 
journalists and news organisations enjoy in each country and the efforts made by the state 
to respect and ensure respect for this freedom.” It does so by conducting a survey among 
partner organisations, correspondents, journalists, researchers, jurists and human rights 
activists. The Press Freedom Index can be found for the period from 2002 to 2009. The 
more independently a country’s media is considered to be able to act, the lower its score 
(RSF 2009). 
The coding and aggregation method of the RSF Press Freedom Index makes it an 
instrument that overemphasises differences at the less-free end of the scale. When 
transforming this data onto our 0 to 1 scale, we thus chose an algorithm that renders 0.1 
for a score of 70 while proportionally transforming higher (= worse) scores up to the 
maximum (worst) value of 115, which represents zero. At the other end of the scale, 
values move again proportionally between 1 (for a Press Freedom score of 0.0) and 0.1 
(70).   
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Granted asylums by country of origin 
As for battle-related deaths, absolute values are transformed into values per 100,000 
inhabitants using the Penn World Table data (Heston / Summers / Aten 2009). 
The imputation provides us with complete data on all our indicators for 163 countries 
from 2003 to 2010. Given the amount of missing data in early years and in 2010, we 
consider the period 2006 to 2009 to be most reliable. 
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Annex 5:  Summary statistics and graphs of the aggregate scores 
Figure: Properties of the dimension variables (average 2007–2009) 
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Table: Summary statistics of indicators (average 2007–2009) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Authority 0.61 0.23 0.04 0.98 
Monopoly of violence (BTI) 0.75 0.19 0.04 1.00 
Homicides 0.79 0.16 0.27 0.98 
Battle deaths 0.90 0.22 0.15 1.00 
Capacity 0.43 0.28 0.01 0.96 
Basic administrative structures (BTI) 0.67 0.22 0.01 1.00 
Under-5 mortality 0.76 0.22 0.04 0.95 
Primary school enrolment 0.78 0.18 0.20 0.99 
Improved water access 0.81 0.18 0.27 1.00 
Legitimacy 0.48 0.27 0.00 0.99 
Physical integrity rights violations (PTS) 0.59 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Press freedom (RSF) 0.63 0.27 0.05 0.99 
Asylum seekers 0.76 0.27 0.00 1.00 
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